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INTRODUCTION

Two common credit enhancement devices used in international
project finance, namely surety bonds and standby letters of credit, have
their origins in the common law system. This Article will address their
characteristics and how they are applied in a civil law system,
specifically in Perf. I will analyze common problems and different
approaches with regard to these devices in the context of an
international project financing in Perd.
In Part I, I will define credit enhancement and briefly describe the
several types of devices used in international project finance. In Part II,
I will address letters of credit, in particular standby letters of credit
defining their nature and analyzing how they are different from
independent guarantees. Moreover, I will tackle the nature of Peruvian
Cartas Fianza Bancarias, ending this Part with an analysis of what
instrument would be more beneficial to U.S. lenders and explaining
how fraud is related to the standbys' practice.
Part III tackles surety bonds. First, I will briefly address how they
work in the United States and internationally, defining their nature and
main characteristics. I will discuss the problem that arises when the
surety decides not to pay the surety bond. In this Part, I will also
describe the Peruvian Fianza, which is the closest instrument to a surety
bond in Peruvian legislation. Finally, I will compare the benefits of
surety bonds and Fianzas to U.S. lenders, concluding that because of
serious enforcement problems derived from the accessory nature of this
credit enhancement device, U.S. lenders should consider Cartas Fianza
Bancarias instead of surety bonds or Fianzas when facing international
project finance in Perfi.
I. CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

This Part will address the need for credit enhancement in an
international project financing and will also briefly describe the several
types of credit enhancement devices, focusing mainly on two of the
most important forms used, that is, letters of credit and performance
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bonds.
A. Why is Credit Enhancement Important?
To understand its importance, it is essential to know what we mean
by credit enhancement. In contrast to corporate finance, lenders in
project finance rely mostly on revenue-producing project contracts to
service the debt.' This idea is particularly reflected in the nonrecourse
or limited recourse nature of project finance. Basically, nonrecourse
project finance is based "completely on the merits of a project rather
than the credit of the project sponsor." 2 In this respect, the lenders do
not have recourse against the sponsors; they will have to depend upon
the cash flow generated by the project itself.3 On the other hand, in
limited recourse project finance, obligations of the sponsors do exist but
they are limited. Thus, the lenders will have recourse to the project
sponsor's assets only until the construction is complete. Thereafter, the
loan will become nonrecourse.
Hence, the lenders focus their credit assessment on the projected
cash flow of the revenue-producing project contracts and use the project
assets as collateral. 6 Unfortunately, often the project assets are valuable
only to the project, or their foreclosure is costly or difficult in the host
country. Moreover, the projected cash flow is subject to several risks.
The creditworthiness of the project and its capacity to generate revenue
to service the debt is extremely sensitive because it does not only
depend on the project company's behavior. In fact, in international
projects, the numerous participants enter into multiple and diverse
agreements that form a global structure. This is called "transactional
unity."7
Although each contract in project finance is concluded among
different parties and has a different specific aim, "each transaction
contributes to the general purpose of the project: the economic viability
of the roject company and its capacity to make profits and to repay its
loans." The series of contracts are thought to support the generation of
revenues by the project to repay the debt to the lenders.
1.

Scorr L. HOFFMAN, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE

246 (3d ed. 2008).
2. Id. at 4.
3. Id. 1.03.
4. Id. 1.04, at 5.
5. Id.
6. Shalanda H. Baker, Unmasking Project Finance: Risk Mitigation, Risk Inducement,
and an Invitation to Development Disaster?, 6 TEX. J. OIL GAs & ENERGY L. 273, 312-13
(2010).
7. Christophe Dugud, Dispute Resolution in InternationalProjectFinance Transactions,
24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1064, 1067 (2001).
8. Id. at 1069.
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Therefore, the creditworthiness of the project and its capability to
produce revenue relies upon the compliance by every party of their
obligations under every agreement. Any breach could seriously affect
the right of the lenders to be repaid. Hence, the lenders bear a direct
interest in every contract related to the project. As there are several
parties involved, the risks are bigger than in a single transaction. Thus
lenders will not look only to the project cash flow as their exclusive
source for repayment even if the project is considered economically
viable.
Hence, credit support from a creditworthy source is necessary to
make the lenders more comfortable. In fact, it will be a "condition
precedent to the loan closing that the credit enhancement documentation
be in place. It will also be a loan default if it is no longer in place." 0
Generally, credit enhancement can be defined as any device to enhance
the creditworthiness of the project, protecting the lenders from internal 1
and external risks and uncertainties. 12 The lenders, without credit
enhancement devices, would probably not lend any money to project
companies on account of the great uncertainty resulting from possible
breach of contracts to which the lenders are not parties, which
ultimately would affect the main form of repayment of the debt, that is,
the cash flow and revenues from the project operation.
B. Types of CreditEnhancement
There are several types of credit enhancement. Different devices of
credit support will be borne by different parties such as the project
sponsors, third parties, suppliers and purchasers of the project company,
among others. Credit enhancement mechanisms will be combined to
distribute the risks among the project participants without burdening
any of them' 3 in a manner that the project financing becomes a recourse
financing.
Credit enhancement can be external or internal. Common forms of
external credit enhancement include letters of credit, surety bonds and
guarantees while internal devices include capital contributions to the
equity of the special purpose vehicle' 4 and other forms of credit
9. Alexander F.H. Loke, Risk Management and Credit Support in Project Finance, 2

SlNG.

J. INT'L & COMP. L. 37, 55 (1998).
10. See HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 247.

11. By internal, I am referring to the breach of any project contract by any project
participant.
12.

See HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 5.

13. See id. at 247.
14. The Comm. on Bankr. and Corporate Reorganization of the Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of N.Y., Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BuS. LAW. 527, 534 (1995) [hereinafter
Bankruptcy Committee].
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enhancement internal to the transactions like cash collateral accounts.'
Overall, credit support devices also include limited and indirect
guarantees, insurance, liquidated damages, indemnification obligations
and additional equity commitments.' 6 I will briefly describe the most
relevant devices, going deeper into the letters of credit and performance
bonds because they are perceived in the common law system to be two
of the most efficient credit enhancement mechanisms.
1. Guarantees
In international project financing the lenders make loans to the
project company, who is the borrower of the financing instead of the
project sponsors. By means of a guarantee, a guarantor substitutes its
creditworthiness for the creditworthiness of the project company.
"Guarantees are binding commitments on the part of the guarantor to
answer for [the] default" of the principal obligor.17 Thus, the value of a
guarantee as a credit enhancement mechanism depends on the
creditworthiness of the guarantor.
Both the sponsors and third parties can be guarantors of the project
company. The lenders should consider and evaluate carefully the
creditworthiness of the proposed guarantor before accepting any
guarantee. Therefore, this credit enhancement device is not preferred by
the lenders. Moreover, guarantees are accessory to the principal
obligation, which means that if the underlying obligation is void or if its
conditions are materially altered without the consent of the guarantor,
the guarantee is not enforceable either.19 Further, guarantees are also
secondary obligations, thus guarantors may assert against a creditor
both the defenses of the underlying obligor and the existing defenses
under the guarantee itself.20
Therefore, unless the guarantor agrees to provide a waiver of those
defenses and to oblige itself in an absolute, direct and unconditional
manner, the guarantee may not be sufficient for the lenders21 who would
have to request from the guarantors access to collateral securities such
as mortgages, pledges, and cash collateral 22 among others. However, the
real strength of these collaterals will rely upon what the applicable law
to them is and what jurisdiction will enforce them.
15.

Id. at 539.

16.

See HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 247.

17.

See Loke, supra note 9, at 56.

18.

See HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 247.

19. Robert D. Aicher et al., Credit Enhancement: Letters of Credit, Guaranties,
Insuranceand Swaps (The Clash of Cultures), 59 Bus. LAW. 897, 913 (2004).
20. Id. at 912.
21.

See HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 247.

22.

Id. at 248.
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The lenders will only grant the loan if contractual obligations can be
enforced and this enforceability will depend on the "oxygen of a legal
system." 23 Therefore, a choice of law provision is essential to achieve
the enforceability of a guarantee because that law will govern the
guarantee and the merits of a potential dispute. Furthermore, a choice of
forum clause is equally important since it will govern the submission of
a dispute to arbitration or to a particular jurisdiction's court system and
this choice is critical because a favorable court with jurisdiction over the
guarantor will be of great relevance to enforce the guarantee. 24
a. Limited Guarantees
Guarantors are often reluctant to provide an absolute, direct and
unconditional guarantee. Instead, they prefer limited and indirect
guarantees. Hence, guarantors often provide guarantees limited in
amount or time so that the guarantee will only have a small impact on
the guarantors' credit standing and financial statements. 25 For instance,
a completion guarantee typically provided by the project sponsors such
as the commitment to provide additional capital to the project company
is a limited guarantee. The sponsor provides this guarantee to cover
the "risk that the project is not completed and able to operate at the time
required," 27 thus it agrees to provide a certain amount of additional
equity to the project company so that it can complete the project.
b. Indirect Guarantees
Unlike scope-limited guarantees, indirect guarantees are "based on
the underlying credit of one of the project participants and are not
subject to defenses available to a guarantor under a guarantee
agreement." 2 8 These indirect guarantees are the revenue producing
contracts. 29 Probably the most important is the take-or-pay off-take
agreement where the purchaser of the output of the project has an
unconditional payment obligation even if no goods or services are
delivered. 30 The obligation of the output buyer is independent of the
actual delivery and even of the quality of the product delivered. Thus,
these agreements are deemed indirect guarantees of cash flow for the
23. Ken Miyamoto, MeasuringLocal Legal Risk Premium in Project Finance Bonds, 40
VA. J. INT'L L. 1125, 1130 (2000).
24. See HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 249.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 250.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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project. 3 1
However, if credit enhancement mechanisms are necessary because
of the possibility that a party of the several project contracts breaches its
obligations, thus precluding the generation of the revenues to service the
debt, it is inconclusive that a take-or-pay contract should be considered
itself as a credit support device. On the contrary, credit enhancement
devices such as guarantees are necessary precisely because a breach in
take-or-pay contracts can seriously affect the creditworthiness of the
project.
2. Surety Bonds
These instruments are issued to cover the commercial risk of project
completion. A surety typically issues performance and payment bonds
to mitigate the risk that the contractor defaults on its obligations under
the construction agreement and the project is not completed or does not
operate at a specified level of production.32 Even though several types
of surety bonds exist, such as bid bonds, warranty bonds, retention
money bonds, labor and material payment bonds, I will limit my
analysis to payment bonds and performance bonds due to their
relationship with other types of credit enhancement devices such as
standbys. Moreover, surety bonds are relevant to the lenders because
they are usually assigned to them as part of the project's collateral.3 4
a. Payment Bonds
This kind of surety bond is issued by a surety to serve as guarantee
to the project company, to protect it against the failure of the contractor
to pay any amount due under the construction agreement. 35 For
example, if the contractor does not timely complete the construction of
the project, it will have to pay the project company liquidated damages
for late performance if they were agreed to in the contract.36 Hence, if
the contractor does3 7 not pay these liquidated damages, the surety will
make the payment.
b. Performance Bonds
A performance bond is also issued by the surety in favor of the
31.

See Loke, supra note 9, at 58, 59.

32.

See HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 252.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

For a brief description of these different kinds of bonds, see id. at 252, 253.
See id. at 252.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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project company but to protect it against the failure of the contractor to
perform the terms and conditions of the construction agreement other
than the obligation to pay sums of money such as liquidated damages.3 8
If the contractor fails to comply with its obligations under the
construction contract, the surety "will cause the performance of the
contract so that the project is completed."3 9
3. Letters of Credit
Two types of letters of credit exist. The commercial letter of credit,
generally called a documentary letter of credit, is a mechanism of
payment in international sales, and the standby or guarantee letter of
credit is one of the most important credit enhancement devices for the
lenders. 40 Both letters of credit imply that a bank substitutes its payment
obligation and creditworthiness for the payment obligation and
creditworthiness of the principal debtor. 4 1 However, unlike commercial
letters of credit, the obligation of the issuing bank under a standby is
triggered upon default.4 2 Thus, the use of standbys in project finance
means that the bank will guarantee the compliance with the obligations
of any of the parties of the project contracts.4 3 For instance, standby
letters of credit may be issued to protect against the project company's
failure to perform its contractual obligations or against the constructor's
failure to perform its duties under the construction agreement. This
device protects against the breach of both payment obligations or
performance obligations.4 4 In case the obligor defaults on any of them,
upon delivery of certain documents, a bank will promptly pay the sum
indicated in the text of the standby letter of credit in favor of the
beneficiary of that document.

II. LETTERS OF CREDIT
A. Standby Letter of Credit
Unlike commercial letters of credit or documentary credits, standby
letters of credit are "used as a guarantee or a performance bond."4 5 For
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

45.

Ralph H. Folsom et al., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM-

ORIENTED COURSEBOOK, 303 (Thomson Reuters, 11th ed. 2012).
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commercial letters of credit there is an exhaustive list of documents to
be presented in order to honor the documentary credit. Meanwhile, the
honoring of the standby might be achieved only with a mere written
allegation by the beneficiary that the other party failed to perform its
obligations under the underlying contract. Even though the standby
letter of credit may also include in its text a requirement to present some
documents if agreed to by the parties, this type of instrument pays much
less attention to documents than commercial letters of credit do.
1. Independence Principle
Both types of letters of credit are ruled by the independence
principle. This principle involves that a letter of credit is a primary
obligation for the bank, independent of the underlying transaction.
This principle clearly "distinguishes the letter of credit. . . from a

guaranty, which is a secondary obligation by the guarantor."4 7
Moreover, this principle also distinguishes the letter of credit from a
performance bond. The issuer of a letter of credit, in particular the
issuer of a standby, cannot claim the defenses that arise from the
underlying contract. Furthermore, in standbys unlike guarantees or
surety bonds, the issuer "is not to inquire into whether non-documentary
conditions with respect to the underlying transaction have been satisfied
prior to paying." 48
2. International Rules for Standbys
Standbys can be used domestically or internationally. Standbys are
common law mechanisms to guarantee more efficient transactions.
Their civil law analog is the independent or demand guarantee. 49 The
only treaty that tackles independent guarantees and standbys is the
"U.N. Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of
Credit" (Convention). The Convention is an international treaty
prepared by the "U.N. Commission on International Trade Law"
(UNCITRAL) to promote uniformity in the international practice of
independent guarantees and standbys. Unfortunately, only eight states
including the United States have ratified the Convention. For the
purposes of this Article, it is relevant to point out that Peri' has not
ratified this instrument to date. Thus, it is of great importance to know
the law applicable to the standby in the context of an international
project financing where American lenders are the beneficiaries of
46.
47.
48.
49.

See Aicher et al., supra note 19, at 902.
Id.
Id. at 905.
See Folsom et al., supra note 45, at 305.
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standbys issued by Peruvian banks.
On the other hand, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
developed three bodies of guidelines applicable to letters of credits:
1. Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits
(UCP600): The UCP600 was thought to be applied for
commercial letters of credit rather than for standbys.
However, some of its guidelines may be applicable for
standby letters of credit as well.
2. International standby practices (ISP98): The ISP98 provides
guidelines for standbys setting the most common usages of
this instrument in the international practice.
3. Uniform rules for demand guarantees (URDG): The ICC
created the URDG for a uniform application of demand
guarantees. 5 0
There is a blurry boundary between the ISP98 and the URDG
because of the similar nature of standbys and demand guarantees that
may cause confusion. That may be the reason why none of the ICC
guidelines were adopted by Peruvian legislation as national rules. On
the contrary, Per6 has its own domestic rules regarding letters of credit.
However, Peruvian legislation is highly respectful of party autonomy,
thus if Peruvian banks decide to incorporate these guidelines into the
text of the letters of credit they issue, the ICC incorporated guideline
will become binding among the parties to the transaction. Nevertheless,
Peruvian banks may seldom incorporate the UCP600, the ISP98 or the
URDG into their letters of credit, which are called in Peru "cartas fianza
bancarias" (CFB).
B. Peruvian CFB
American lenders can request a standby from Peruvian banks.
Nonetheless, in the Peruvian banking system it is more common to issue
a CFB. In this Part, I will address their main differences, if any, which
would be more beneficial for the lenders and the possibility that
Peruvian banks refuse to honor the letter of credit.
1. Are CFBs Standbys or Independent Guarantees?
To address this issue, I will first analyze if there is any difference
between these two categories. "There is a widespread belief that
50. This is explained by: (i) the documentary nature of both types of letters of credit,
even acknowledging that standbys rely much less on documents than commercial letters of
credit, and (ii) the fact that both types of instruments also share the independence principle.
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standbys are different from independent guarantees." 5 Nonetheless, few
people seem to know to what extent they differ. That belief led the
Institute of International Banking Law & Practice to adopt in 1998 the
ISP98 a set of guidelines published in October of that year by the
ICC. Standbys originated in the United States. They did not use the
term independent guarantee because "guarantee" in the American law
involves an accessory obligation of the guarantor. Thus, the U.S. legal
system came up with a new term, the standby letter of credit to refer to
an independent security.53
a. Nature
Rule 1.06 of the ISP98 provides that a standby is an irrevocable,
independent, documentary, and binding undertaking. By irrevocable, it
should be understood that "once issued, the standby including any
amendment is irrevocable for its stated term" 54 so that the issuing bank
will be bound with no possibility to amend or cancel the standby
unilaterally.5 5 Likewise, Article 5 of the URDG also states that an
independent guarantee is an irrevocable undertaking, unless otherwise
indicated. 56 Both the ISP98 and the URDG are just guidelines, thus, the
parties can divert from them. However, if they declare that the
instrument is revocable, then the instrument used would be neither a
standby nor an independent guarantee. Therefore, the irrevocability of
standbys and independent guarantees is part of its nature to protect the
beneficiaries, who would be the lenders for the purposes of this Article.
The second element of the nature of a standby is probably the most
important. The independence principle5 7 provides that "the obligation
under a standby does not depend upon any relationship or undertaking
51.

ROELAND F. BERTRAMS, BANK GUARANTEES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 7 (3d rev. ed.

2004).
52. Id. at 30.
53. Id. at 4.
54.

JAMES E. BYRNE, THE OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL STANDBY

PRACTICES 25 (1st ed. 1998).
55.

INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL

BANKING LAW & PRACTICE, INC.,

INTERNATIONAL

STANDBY PRACTICES ISP98 15 (1998) [hereinafter ISP98].
56.

GEORGES AFFAKI,

ICC UNIFORM

RULES ON DEMAND

GUARANTEES

A USER'S

HANDBOOK TO THE URDG, 36 (1st ed. 2003).

57.

See ISP98, supra note 55, Rule 1.06(c):
Because a standby is independent, the enforceability of an issuer's obligations
under a standby does not depend on: the issuer's right or ability to obtain
reimbursement from the applicant; the beneficiary's right to obtain payment
from the applicant; a reference in the standby to any reimbursement agreement
or underlying transaction; or the issuer's knowledge of performance or breach
of any reimbursement agreement or underlying transaction.
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except the undertaking of the issuer to the beneficiary. This principle
applies even if the standby contains a reference to the underlying
agreement, reimbursement agreement or any other contract."
Similarly, the essential characteristic of a demand or independent
guarantee is its independence. 59 It is independent both from the
underlying transaction between the principal and the beneficiary and
also from the relationship that arises when the principal requests the
guarantor to issue the guarantee. 60 Hence, it is independent from any
reimbursement agreement as well. Consequently, both standbys and
independent guarantees also share this characteristic. Their
independence is of great importance because it is what makes them
different from regular guarantees and surety bonds. The payment
obligation of the guarantor is only determined by the conditions of
payment expressly indicated in the issued instrument, regardless of any
defenses existing under the underlying transaction61 or under the
reimbursement agreement.
The documentary nature of a standby is closely related to its
independence 62 and implies that the only obligation of the issuer before
paying consists of examining on their face the documents required in
the standby when presented by the beneficiary. With regard to the
independent guarantees, the URDG establishes that a guarantee "may
require as a condition for its payment the presentation of specified
documents, including, for instance, an engineer's certificate." 63 In both
cases, whether for a standby or an independent guarantee, the
submission of certain documents may be included as a payment
condition. However, this is not mandatory. Article 4.08 of the ISP98
asserts that if the standby does not specify any document to be
presented to the issuer, "it will still be deemed to require a documentary
demand for payment." 64
Similarly, even when facing a first demand guarantee, which is a
type of independent guarantee under the URDG that only requires for its
payment the presentation of a simple demand or request for payment by
the beneficiary, the standby's documentary nature is given by the fact
that the beneficiary must present a document demanding or requesting
the payment. Article 20.a of the URDG provides that the demand for
payment must be in writing and be supported by a written statement
detailing: (i) that the account party (principal) is in breach of his
58. See BYRNE, supra note 54, at 26.
59. The independence principle for demand or independent guarantees is contained in
Article 2.b of the URDG.
60.
61.

See AFFAKI, supra note 56, at 15.
See BERTRAMS, supra note 51, at 32.

62. See BYRNE, supra note 54, at 26.
63.

See AFFAKI, supra note 56, at 15.

64.

See ISP98, supra note 55, at 35.
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obligations; and (ii) the nature and extent of the breach.6 5 Therefore, the
beneficiary shall have to submit its demand for payment in writing,
including a statement of default, indicating the nature of that default.
Accordingly, both the ISP98 and the URDG assert a documentary
nature even if no documents are required other than the very demand for
payment. The key factor in both cases is that no non-documentary
conditions for payment should be included in the standby or the
independent guarantee. Rule 4.11(a) of the ISP98 states that nondocumentary terms or conditions included in a standby must be
disregarded.
Moreover, according to rule 4.11 .b., non-documentary conditions are
terms that do not require the presentation of a document and that the
issuer cannot determine from its own records or within its normal
operations.6 7 Hence, if the issuing bank can determine the condition
from its own records or within its own operations, this condition will
not be deemed to be non-documentary and thus will be permitted.
Likewise, the URDG provides the exclusion of any non-documentary
condition in demand guarantees because this type of condition "would
create a link with the underlying transaction that is likely to convert the
demand guarantee into an accessory suretyship." 68 The URDG also
allows conditions "determinable by the guarantor from its own records
(e.g., by verifying the receipt of an advance payment on an account
opened in the guarantor's books), or as a result of an act within his
sphere of normal operations (e.g., consulting a publicly quoted rate)." 6 9
In sum, both instruments are identical as to their documentary nature
as well. Furthermore, no one can deny that both are binding
instruments, otherwise their utility would be seriously undermined. As a
result of this analysis, there is no difference between a standby and an
independent guarantee as to its nature.
b. Is There Any Difference Between the ISP98 and the URDG?
If there is no difference in their nature, why did the Institute of
International Banking Law & Practice come up with a new set of
guidelines separate from those in the URDG? What is the difference
between these two bodies of guidelines? Besides that they did not want
to use the term guarantee, there should be a more compelling reason to
differentiate standbys from independent guarantees. All in all, "the

65.
66.
67.

See BERTRAMS, supra note 51, at 50.
See BYRNE, supra note 54, at 169.
See ISP98, supra note 55, at 36.

68.
69.

See AFFAKI, supra note 56, at 15.
Id.
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ISP98 is more detailed than the URDG."70 The principal differences
between them are the following:7 1
1. Assignability: Rule 6.02 of the ISP98 requires the bank to
specifically agree to any transfer requested by the beneficiary.
On the other hand, article 4 of the URDG provides that if an
independent guarantee indicates that it is transferable, no
additional consent is necessary from the issuer.
2. Duty to notify principal: Rule 3.10 of the ISP98 asserts that
the issuer is not required to notify the principal debtor of the
demand for payment. Meanwhile, article 17 of the URDG
provides that the bank is required to inform the principal
obligor of a demand for payment.
3. Statement of default: Under rule 4.16 of the ISP98, the
beneficiary needs to present a statement of default only if it is
expressly required in the standby. On the contrary, article 20a
of the URDG requires that the demand for payment be
accompanied by a statement of default, whether or not such
statement is expressly mentioned in the independent
guarantee.
These differences appear to be related only to practice issues.
Moreover, if it is considered that any practice of these instruments may
be varied by the party autonomy, it may be reasonably concluded that
the American standby and the Civil Law independent guarantee
"represent conceptually and legally the same device." 72 This conclusion
is even somehow implied in the very text of rule 1.01(b) of the ISP98 as
it provides that a standby or other similar undertaking, however named
or described may be made expressly subject to the ISP98." The Official
Commentary to the ISP98 expressly asserts that it can be used for
independent guarantees 74 as well. Thus, the remaining question is: why
create a separate set of rules to the URDG if a standby and an
independent guarantee are the same device? Would it not have been
sufficient to improve or make the URDG more detailed? The answer is
not clear. Nevertheless, again the Official Commentary to the ISP98
indicates that these guidelines were drafted to expressly include direct
pay standbys. 75 Accordingly, rule 1.01(a) of the ISP98 states that it
70.
event that
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 142: "The drafters of the ISP98 chose to provide a rule for every conceivable
might occur in the life cycle of a standby letter of credit."
Id. at 139, 141 (distinguishing between the ISP98 and the URDG in chart form).
See BERTRAMS, supra note 51, at 7.
See ISP98, supranote 55, at 13.
See BYRNE, supra note 54, at 2.
Id. at 3.
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applies to performance, financials, and direct pay standbys.76
A performance standby assures the payment of a sum when the
principal obligor defaults on a non-monetary obligation, such as the
completion of a building.7 7 On the other hand, financial standbys also
provide for the payment of an amount but for a failure to make a
payment due by the principal. 8 These types of standbys are quite
common and because they are used in the event of default, standbys are
usually defined as default undertakings. 9 Thus far, there are no
and independent
guarantees.
standbys
differences between
Nevertheless, it is asserted that this qualification is incomplete because
"it fails to encompass direct pay standbys."80 Direct pay standbys are
used for the payment of any amount owed "as it regularly becomes due
and without their being any default." 8 ' Thus, the direct pay standby is
not payable upon default. This explains one of the main differences
stated above between the ISP98 and the URDG. In the ISP98 a
statement of default is not required to proceed with the payment unless
expressly indicated in the standby.
Therefore, the only reason that explains why the ISP98 was drafted,
and that could support why standbys are said to be different from
independent guarantees, is the so-called direct pay standbys.
Nonetheless, a direct pay standby looks more similar to a documentary
credit than to a standby. In my view, direct pay standbys are
erroneously included in the ISP98 and their only effect is to contribute
to the existing confusion as regards to the equivalence between standbys
and independent guarantees. The very name of a standby was thought to
address a situation where it should be awaited for making the payment
until a default occurred. This instrument was created as a default
undertaking as opposed to ordinary letters of credit, which are
mechanisms of payment, in short, credits. In a nutshell, ordinary letters
of credit are credits granted by banks to substitute the payment
obligation of the principal obligor upon the presentation of certain
agreed documents thus, they are documentary credits. The underlying
logic in standbys is not to function as credits but as guarantees.
A direct pay standby is intended to serve as the primary payment
recourse, rather than as a guarantee. Therefore, it would constitute an
ordinary letter of credit or documentary credit because a bank
substitutes the payment obligations of the obligor as they become due.
The only differences between a direct pay standby and other ordinary
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See ISP98, supranote 55, at 13.
See BYRNE, supra note 54, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
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letters of credit are that the first is mainly used in a recurring manner,
for instance, for the payment of installments and unlike the latter a
direct pay letter of credit does not require the presentation of many
documents except for the request for payment and other additional
documents as expressly stated in the letter of credit. It will not require
the presentation of usual shipping documents. Nevertheless, these
practical differences do not exclude direct pay letters of credit from the
scope of the UCP600.
Documentary credits are subject to the application of the UCP600,
which defines them as any arrangement that is irrevocable and thus,
constitutes a definite undertaking by the issuing bank to pay upon the
delivery of documents that is in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the undertaking. 82 Unlike the UCP50083 that permitted
revocable letters of credit, the UCP600 stress the irrevocable character
of the documentary credits even if there is no indication to that effect. 84
As direct pay standbys are irrevocable undertakings to substitute the
payment obligation of the principal upon the presentation of certain
documents it is reasonable to conclude they are documentary credits
ruled under the UCP600.
2. Peruvian Legislation Regarding CFBs
Standbys as default undertakings-excluding direct pay standbys,
which I posit are documentary credits-and independent guarantees are
conceptually the same device with only minor differences relating to
practice. Thus, CFBs could be either one. American lenders in a project
financin in Pent may be confident that CFBs share the same nature of a
standby. Nevertheless, the Peruvian banking system does not usually
use either the ISP98 or the URDG." The CFBs are regulated by the
Peruvian banking legislation as well as by the Civil Code regarding the
suretyship, as applicable.
a. Peruvian Banking Law
Article 217.4 of the Banking Law provides that the banks cannot
82. UCP 600 DRAFTING GROUP, COMMENTARY ON UCP 600 ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE
ANALYSIS, 16 (1st ed. 2007) [hereinafter UCP Commentary].

83. Id. "The UCP 600 definition includes the general principle that all documentary
credits under the rules are considered to be irrevocable; the concept of revocable documentary
credits has been removed from UCP 600."
84. Id. at 26: "Reference to a documentary credit is always intended to mean an
irrevocable documentary credit unless the documentary credit itself states otherwise."
85. CFBs are independent, irrevocable, binding, and documentary undertakings.
86. The UCP600 is also excluded because it is more applicable to ordinary letters of
credit.
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issue CFBs for unlimited amounts or terms. Thus, they are limited
guarantees.8 8 This will hardly be a surprise for U.S. lenders accustomed
to standbys. Article 9.01 of the ISP98 states: a standby must contain an
expiry date or allow the issuing bank to terminate the standby either by
giving reasonable prior notice to the beneficiary or by paying.
However, the Peruvian provisions are even stricter than the ISP98 since
it does not give any alternative. The rule is clear: CFBs must have an
expiry date. Peruvian banks cannot be obliged indefinitely. On the other
hand, with regard to the limit in the amount of the CFBs, the ISP98 is
designed to be compatible 90 and completely consistent with the
Convention, which clearly stipulates that the undertaking must be for a
certain or determinable amount. 91 Hence, standbys are to be issued for
limited sums like CFBs.
Moreover, Article 217.5 of the Peruvian Banking Law prohibits the
banks from issuing CFBs or guaranteeing in any manner the repayment
of loans granted by third parties other than national or foreign banks or
finance institutions. 92 In the context of international project financing,
87. Ley General del Sistema Financiero y del Sistema de Seguros y Orginica de la
Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros, Ley No 26702, art. 217.4 ("Article 217-PROHIBITED
TRANSACTIONS AND ACTIVITIES. Notwithstanding any other prohibitions contained in
this act, companies of the financial system shall be subject to the following prohibitions: .. . 4.
To grant guaranties or support in any way third-party responsibilities, by undetermined amounts
or terms; . . .").
88. Likewise, a URDG guarantee must also state the maximum amount payable and the
expiry date or expiry event of the guarantee. See Affaki, supra note 56, at 129.
89. See ISP98, supra note 55, at 54.
90. Id. at 8.
91. U.N. Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit-Article
2. Undertaking
(1) For the purposes of this Convention, an undertaking is an independent
commitment, known in international practice as an independent guarantee or as
a stand-by letter of credit, given by a bank or other institution or person
("guarantor/issuer") to pay to the beneficiary a certain or determinable amount
upon simple demand or upon demand accompanied by other documents, in
conformity with the terms
(2) For the purposes of subparagraph (c) of paragraph (1) of this article, the
following are types of situations in which a demand has no conceivable basis:
(a) The contingency or risk against which the undertaking was designed to
secure the beneficiary has undoubtedly not materialized;
(b) The underlying obligation of the principal/applicant has been declared
invalid by a court or arbitral tribunal, unless the undertaking indicates that such
contingency falls within the risk to be covered by the undertaking;
(c) The underlying obligation has undoubtedly been fulfilled to the satisfaction
of the beneficiary;
(d) Fulfillment of the underlying obligation has clearly been prevented by
willful misconduct of the beneficiary ...
92.

Ley General del Sistema Financiero y del Sistema de Seguros y Orginica de la
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this provision means that the U.S. lenders will be able to obtain CFBs in
their favor if they are banks or financial institutions lending money to
the project company. The only possibility affected this provision would
be if the American lenders were not banks or financial institutions. For
instance if they are U.S. corporations lending to the project company,
they would not be able to request CFBs, standbys or other instruments
to guarantee the repayment of the loan.
This prohibition only applies to traditional loan agreements, thus if
the American corporation is funding the project company by means of
bonds, it would be entitled to obtain a CFB. Furthermore, this rule does
not undermine the assignment of a CFB in favor of the lender (a U.S.
corporation) if it was issued to guarantee, for instance, the obligations of
the contractor under the construction agreement.
b. Circular No B-2101-2001
This Circular is a regulation issued by the Superintendence of Banks
to complement the Peruvian Banking Law. 93 It takes the usual practices
of Peruvian banks and embodies them in the text of the norm. The CFBs
include provisions regarding their automatic and immediate execution
by payment. Thus, they must be paid without delay, on first demand in
writing. 94 This characteristic brings CFBs closer to the concept of first
demand guarantees. A standby or an independent guarantee may
contain diverse conditions of payment or payment mechanisms. In both
cases, the payment can be on first demand or upon the submission of
third-party documents. Peruvian CFBs are seldom subject to the
submission of third-party documents. In most of the cases they will only
require a first demand in writing requesting the payment that must be
automatic and immediate.9 6 This characteristic has led first demand
Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros, Ley No 26702, art. 217.5:
Article 217 0-PROHIBITED

TRANSACTIONS AND ACTIVITIES.

Notwithstanding any other prohibitions contained in this act, companies of the
financial system shall be subject to the following prohibitions: ...
5. To guarantee loans contracted with third parties, unless any of the referred
third parties is another company of the financial system, or a foreign bank or
finance company; ...
93. EstablishPrecisionsfor the Grantingand Payment of Guarantees, Bonds, and Other
Guarantees, Circular No. B-2101, 2001, available at http://www.sbs.gob.pe/O/modulos/JER/
JERInterna.aspx?ARE=0&PFL=0&JER=105.
94. Id. at 2.
95. This is a type of independent guarantee under the URDG, which only requires for its
payment the presentation of a simple demand or request for payment by the beneficiary.
96. In practice, the Peruvian banks often include a provision in CFBs requiring that the
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guarantees, in this particular case the CFBs, to be considered
unconditional guarantees9 7 as opposed to guarantees requiring the
submission of third-party documents, which are often called conditional
guarantees.98
Therefore, it is unsurprising that CFBs commonly state that they are
unconditional because they cannot contain previous requirements or
conditions to make the payment. In first demand guarantees such as the
CFBs, the beneficiaries are entitled to immediate payment without any
proof of the default 99 or the amount of loss.' 0 A demand and a
statement of default are accepted as conclusive evidence of liability. To
this regard, Article 1.10(a) of the ISP98 indicates that a standby should
not state that it is unconditional' 0 ' and if it does, it should merely mean
that payment is "conditioned solely on presentation of specified
documents."' 0 2 Hence, according to the ISP98, standbys are conditioned
on the submission of documents. In accordance with this interpretation,
first demand guarantees should also be deemed conditional because the
payment would be conditioned on the presentation of the demand and
the statement of default. Nonetheless, in my opinion asserting the
unconditional nature of the CFBs provides strength to the instrument
since it is thought of as an assurance for the creditors and its only aim is
to make it clear to judges and third parties that the banks cannot impose
any condition to payment when receiving a conforming presentation of
a demand and statement of default. Consequently, this document
purports to be related more to the documentary nature of CFBs than to a
conditional undertaking.
On the other hand, the immediate payment obligation borne by the
banks is complemented by the provisions of the Civil Code related to
suretyship. Hence, the issuing bank must inform the debtor about the
CFB's payment. However, while in a regular suretyship the surety sends
the communication before paying, in the case of CFBs, the Circular
provides that the communication to the debtor and the payment shall be
effected simultaneously. The intention behind this rule is clearly to
provide the beneficiary of the CFB, in this case the U.S. lender, with the
certainty that it will obtain payment and that the debtor will not have the
opportunity to try to preclude the payment from the bank. Finally, the
Circular also reaffirms that CFBs are primary obligations of the issuer
first demand in writing be through a notarized letter to provide certainty to the document. In
addition, the payment is made by check.
97.

See BERTRAMS, supra note 51, at 49.

98. Id. at 54.
99. Id. at 3.
100. Id. at 48.
101. There is no similar provision in the URDG, banning the use of the term
unconditional.
102. See ISP98, supra note 55, at 19.
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and are independent from the underlying transaction. It expressly states
that when the banks issue CFBs, they are waiving their right to oppose
the defenses available to the principal debtor.1 03
c. Civil Code Suretyship Rules
In addition to the previously described legislation, CFBs are also
subject to the Civil Code suretyship rules, as applicable. The relevant
provisions that the U.S. lenders should consider encompass the
exemption of liability of the issuer if the beneficiary does not demand
the payment of the guarantee within 15 days after the expiry date of the
CFB. Thus, the American lenders would be entitled to request payment
from the issuing bank for an additional 15-day period after the term
fixed in the CFB is over. This is a particularity of the Peruvian CFB.
Neither the ISP98, nor the URDG stipulate any similar provision.
Further, the CFBs issued to guarantee the obligations of the project
contractor or other project participants are easily assigned to the U.S.
lenders by the product company. Under the Peruvian Civil Code, the
assignment of rights can take place even without the consent of the
guarantor.104 However, the guarantor must be informed of the
assignment; otherwise, it will have no effect upon him. Hence, CFBs
are more similar to an independent guarantee than to a standby
regarding this matter. In Peruvian legislation, unlike the ISP98, the
specific consent of the issuer to the transfer is not required.'o This
characteristic is also beneficial for potential beneficiaries and lenders
because they will be able to achieve liquidity by assigning the CFB
without bearing the burden of obtaining the issuing bank's approval to
the assignment.

103.

Circular No B - 2101-2001, art. 5.
5.2 The Cartas Fianza that contain clauses of automatic and immediate payment
upon simple request for payment in writing must be honored by the guarantor
without any delay. The Cartas Fianza shall not be conditioned or have prior
requirements to make the payment and the guarantor waives its right to oppose
the defenses and remedies available to the principal debtor, which are stipulated
in articles 18800 and 18850 of the Civil Code. ...

Id. art. 5.2 (indicating the notification prescribed by articles 18800 and 18850 of the
Civil Code that the guarantor shall address to the principal debtor in order to inform
him about the payment of the Carta Fianza, shall be effected simultaneously to the
said payment).
104. C6digo Civil, art. 12060 (Assignment of rights. The assignment is a conveyance
pursuant to which, the assignor transfers in favor of the assignee the right to demand the debtor
the compliance of his obligations. The assignment does not require the consent of the debtor).
105. Id.
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C. What Instrument is More Beneficial to U.S. Lenders?
1. Conclusion from Their Main Differences
To address this issue, it is important to sum up the principal
differences between standbys, independent guarantees and CFBs that
U.S. lenders should take into account. First, regarding the assignability
of the instruments, while in standbys the issuing bank will always have
to manifest its consent to the transfer, in independent guarantees if this
consent is expressed in the text of the guarantee, there is no need for
further consent from the bank. As regards CFBs, they go even further
because the assignment of the guarantee can take place even without the
consent of the guarantor. Thus, the suretyship rule stipulated in the civil
code applies, and only if the guarantor is not informed of the
assignment, it will not be effective upon him. In conclusion, the most
favorable scenario for the lenders would be the use of a CFB because
they will be able to get assigned or assign the document by only
informing the guarantor of the assignment.
Second, with regard to the duty to notify the principal, while in
standbys the issuer is not required to notify the principal debtor of the
demand for payment, in the case of independent guarantees, the bank is
required to inform the principal obligor of a demand for payment.
However, the issuer is not obliged to give notice the principal before
making paymentl06 and if it does, the issuing bank is not required to
wait for a response from the principal. 107 Thus, in either case, there are
no prejudicial effects upon the lenders. That would also be true in the
case of a CFB because the communication to the debtor and the
payment would be effected simultaneously.
In addition, as regards the statement of default, while in standbys a
statement of default is only required if it is expressly stated in the
standby, in the case of independent guarantees, there is an obligation of
accompanying the demand for payment with a statement of default,
whether or not expressly mentioned in the independent guarantee,
unless it is expressly excluded. When a statement of default is required
in a standby, Article 4.16 of the ISP98 states that a demand for payment
need not be separate from the beneficiary's statement of default or other
required document. 08 Hence, the demand may be implied from the
presentation of another required document. For instance, the
presentation of a statement of default would render the demand
106. See AFFAKI, supra note 56, at 81.
107. Id.
108. UNCITRAL, art. 4.16, at 589 (Demand for payment: "(a) A demand for payment
need not be separate from the beneficiary's statement or other required document.
availableat http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/textsendorsed/ISP98_e.pdf.
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unnecessary since the default statement would be considered an implied
demand. 0' 9
In the case of the CFBs, there is no rule with regard to presenting a
statement of default. It will depend on the issuing bank and the terms it
includes in its CFBs. In some cases, it will be sufficient to present a
demand of payment; in others, the statement of default will be enough.
However, the most common usage is to request in the text of the CFB
for both the demand and the statement of default, which do not need to
be in separate documents similarly to the standbys. Hence, it is
complicated to see any benefit for the lenders arising from these
differences.
Finally, unlike standbys and independent guarantees, CFBs have a
clear benefit for lenders, as they are entitled to request payment from
0
the issuing bank for an additional 15-day period after the expiry date.o"
This characteristic, besides its flexible nature regarding its assignability,
make CFBs a favorable device for lenders. They can expect CFBs to be
expeditious first demand guarantees.
2. Fraud
Nevertheless, an interesting instrument like a CFB would be
worthless if Peruvian bank's practice implied not honoring its primary
payment obligations. Fortunately, Peruvian banks have strictly assumed
their obligations and it is fairly rare that they do not pay. The underlying
logic is to avoid the possibility of being subject to suits by the
beneficiaries. If the banks receive a communication from the debtor
requesting not to pay the CFB, banks will almost always pay and leave
the potential litigation to the parties (debtor and beneficiary). This
situation is always foreseen in the reimbursement agreement concluded
between the bank and the principal. If a bank refuses to make the
payment, Peruvian courts will hardly ever adjudicate in favor of the
bank. They will most likely impose damages on the bank instead.
However, internationally the existence of fraud is a ground for
refusing to honor letters of credit. Neither the ISP98 nor the URDG
cover fraud. Instead, it is left to the applicable law, such as section 5109 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the United States or the
article 19(c) of the Convention."' For instance, the Convention
provides the issuer with the right to withhold payment if it is clear and
manifest that (i) a document is falsified, (ii) according to the supporting
109.
110.
free from
following
111.

See BYRNE, supra note 54, at 183.
C6digo Civil, art. 18980 (Fixed term Fianza. The guarantor in a fixed-term Finaza is
any liability if the creditor does not request the performance of the obligation in the
15-day period after the expiry date or if it abandons its claim.).
Id. at 20.
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documents there is no default, or (iii) the demand for payment has no
conceivable basis.11 2 First, it is important to highlight that it is a right of
the issuing bank, not its obligation, to withhold payment. The first
possibility is clear; a document was clearly and manifestly forged. The
second possibility also involves the presentation of documents, when
they are not forged but clearly and manifestly show there was no
default, for instance if the letter of credit requires the submission of an
engineer certificate and it demonstrates that there was no default. These
two postulations make sense when the payment mechanism is the
submission of third-party documents.
Nevertheless, CFB, which is a first demand guarantee, the only
document to be presented would be the demand for payment with a
simple statement of default. Under this scheme, that document would
not manifestly show the absence of default. Moreover, the third
possibility included in the Convention would imply a transgression of
the independence principle and of the documentary nature of letters of
credit because the bank refusing to make the payment would have to
look at the transaction "beyond the face of the complying document.""13
Therefore, the existence of fraud as defined in the Convention seems
112. Examples of this no conceivable basis are: (a) The default has undoubtedly not
materialized; (b) The obligation of the principal is declared invalid by a court; (c) The obligation
of the principal has certainly been fulfilled; and (d) Compliance with the obligation was clearly
prevented by willful misconduct of the beneficiary. U.N. CONVENTION ON INDEPENDENT
GUARANTEES AND STAND-BY LETTERS OF CREDIT art. 19 Exception to payment obligation:

(1) ... and any documentary conditions of the undertaking, indicating, or from
which it is to be inferred, that payment is due because of a default in the
performance of an obligation, or because of another contingency, or for money
borrowed or advanced, or on account of any mature indebtedness undertaken
by the principal/applicant or another person.

Id. art. 11. Cessation of right to demand payment:
(1) The right of the beneficiary to demand payment under the undertaking
ceases when:
(a) The guarantor/issuer has received a statement by the beneficiary of release
from liability in a form referred to in paragraph (2) of article 7;
(b) The beneficiary and the guarantor/issuer have agreed on the termination of
the undertaking in the form stipulated in the undertaking or, failing such
stipulation, in a form referred to in paragraph (2) of article 7;
(c) The amount available under the undertaking has been paid, unless the
undertaking provides for the automatic renewal or for an automatic increase of
the amount available or otherwise provides for continuation of the undertaking;
(d) The validity period of the undertaking expires in accordance with the
provisions of article 12.

113.

See BYRNE, supra note 54, at 21.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

23

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 3
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

440

[Vol. 25

unlikely when analyzing a first demand guarantee such as a CFB.
Similarly to the ISP98, the URDG does not cover fraud. However, it is
mentioned as the "guarantor's only accepted defense against a demand
for payment."1 14 Again, in the case of first demand guarantees as
opposed to guarantees payable upon the submission of third-party
documents, it will be very difficult for an issuing bank to argue fraud as
a defense for withholding payment. However, if the principal is able to
establish that the demand is manifestly fraudulent, the principal obligor
will be entitled to obtain an injunction or provisional court measures to
prevent the issuer from paying. In the case of CFBs, Peruvian courts
follow the same approach of other national courts in diverse
jurisdictions, which are very rigorous in appraising the manifest fraud
standard."' 5 Overall, they allow this defense of fraud under very limited
circumstances such as an extremely clear forgery or "the absence
beyond doubt of any right for the beneficiary to claim payment."" 6
Per6, there is no legislation indicating fraud as an exception to the
primary payment obligation of the issuing bank under a CFB. Thus,
banks and national courts tend to be reluctant to invoke fraud as a
defense for withholding payment or issuing an injunction. The threshold
is fairly high and in the absence of a provisional measure issued by the
Peruvian courts, the issuer will pay. Consequently, U.S. lenders can rely
on the certainty that they will get paid immediately under CFBs.
III. SURETY

BONDS

The main surety bonds are performance and payment bonds. While
in the former, in the event of default of a performance obligation, the
issuer will cause the performance of the contract, in the latter the issuer
will pay a sum in the event of default because it is guaranteeing a
payment obligation. Thus, payment bonds are similar to certain
standbys. However, standbys do not only guarantee payment
obligations. While financial standbys guarantee payment obligations,
obligations.
guarantee
performance
performance
standbys
confused
with
standbys
Consequently, payment bonds are sometimes
especially with financial standbys when applied in legal systems other
than the common law system.
In payment bonds and financial standbys, the issuer has the
obligation to make a payment and both are issued as a guarantee of
payment obligations. The confusion is exacerbated when the issuer of
114.

See AFFAKI, supra note 56, at 12.

115. Id. at 14.
116. Id.: Examples "include cases where the beneficiary has already certified in writing
that the principal has performed his obligation in conformity with the contract." Id. at 15.
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the payment bond is a bank because banks also commonly issue
standbys. In the Peruvian case, CFBs are only issued by banks and in
the Peruvian legal system the concept of surety bonds does not exist.
Hence, when a U.S. lender requests the issuance of a payment bond by a
Peruvian bank, a misunderstanding is likely to happen because Peruvian
banks are used to the figure of CFBs (i.e., independent guarantees and
as they are not familiar to the common law concept of payment bond,
they will probably issue a CFB under the name of "Payment Bond").
To make matters more complicated, payment bonds are usually
mixed with performance bonds. Accordingly, payment bonds are often
included within the concept of performance bonds so that the issuer can
either cause the performance or pay if the debtor defaults. Thus,
sometimes U.S. lenders will ask Peruvian banks to issue performance
bonds, intending to include the meaning of a payment bond. If there
were few grounds" 7 to ask for a payment bond, there are even less legal
grounds to request a performance bond from a Peruvian bank.
Under Peruvian legislation, the banks can guarantee an obligation by
paying, but banks do not bind themselves to perform non-monetary
obligations. If an undertaking provides for anything else upon default,
such as performing the principal's obligations pursuant to the
underlying contract, the undertaking would constitute a civil suretyship,
called "Fianza" in Perd." 8 According to the Peruvian banking law, a
Fianza issued by the banks is called CFB and has different rules than the
generic civil Fianza.119 While in a civil suretyship or Fianza, the surety
can perform non-monetary obligations, the banks can only honor CFBs
by paying.
All in all, Peruvian banks cannot issue performance bonds. These
would constitute a type of Fianza or suretyship where the surety would
have to be a non-banking institution. That is the same case for payment
bonds, which are also a class of Fianza. Nevertheless, as they are similar
to financial standbys, Peruvian banks erroneously issue "Payment
bonds" that are in fact CFBs. Fianzas issued by Peruvian banks (CFB)
have several elements that distinguish them from payment bonds.
Therefore, if a U.S. lender requires a performance bond or a payment
bond as credit enhancement for an international project financing in
Perd, it should bear in mind that those instruments will have to be
issued by non-banking institutions.
117. Basically, its similarity with financial standbys.
118. C6digo Civil art. 18680 (in a Fianza, the guarantor has to fulfill certain obligations in
favor of the creditor in case this obligation is not met by the original debtor. The Fianza may be
granted to guarantee the obligations of the debtor or other guarantor).
119. Circular No B - 2101-2001, art. 5, Cartas Fianza ("5.1 The Cartas Fianza issued by
the financial companies are ruled by the provisions of the Civil Code on Fianzas but the
peculiarities stipulated in this Circular and the Banking Law. . . .").
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A. U.S. Surety Bonds
Surety or contract bonds are contracts between three parties where
the surety promises the obligee to perform in substitution of the
principal (performance bonds) or to pay a limited amount of mone
(payment bonds) in the event of default of the principal obligor.1
Sureties enter into these contracts gratuitously or charge the principal a
premium.121 In most cases, sureties will charge a sum because in the
event that the principal defaults, the liability of the surety will arise.
Moreover, in the United States the surety's liability will be determined
not only upon the terms and conditions included in the contract but also
according to the applicable statutes. 122 The most well-known statute is
the Miller Act, which applies to bonds guaranteeing public works
regarding federal contracts. 23 On the state level, there are also statutes
that follow the Miller Act main requirements but for state contracts and
thus, they are called "little Miller Acts." 24 These Acts have their own
bond forms. On the other hand, there are also commonly used bond
forms for private works promulgated by the American Institute of

Architects (AIA).1 2 5
Therefore, contract bond forms vary and the variety of statutes also
contribute to the complexity of the instrument. Several questions
remain. What is the nature of surety bonds? What is their difference
with standbys? Does an international regulation exist?
B. InternationalRules for ContractBonds
Like standbys, surety bonds can be used domestically or
internationally. Nevertheless, they are common law devices; thus, their
application in civil legal systems like Per6's, may be troublesome
especially given the lack of international treaties on the subject. Again,
the ICC developed certain guidelines, which are binding only if
included in the contract bond. These guidelines intend to reach
uniformity in international trade and are called the "Uniform Rules for
Contract Bonds" (URCB).126 Both the concept of surety bonds and the
120. Jonathan J. Dunn & John J. Petro, The Rumble in the Jungle: Letters of Credit,
Bonding, and Default Insurance-hedging Bets in a Roller-Coaster Market, 32 FALL
CONSTRUCTION L. 5, 7 (2012).
121. LAWRENCE R. MOELMANN ET AL., THE LAW OF PERFORMANCE BONDS 4 (2d ed. 2009).
122. EDWARD G. GALLAGHER ET AL., PAYMENT BOND MANUAL 5 (1st ed. 1995).
123. See MOELMANN ET AL., supra note 121, at 3.
124. See GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 122, at 5.

125. Id.
126. UN. Commission on International Trade Law, Yearbook of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, at 596 (2000), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
yearbooks/yb-2000-e/yb 2000_e.pdf [hereinafter U.N. Commission].
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URCB are barely known or applied in the Peruvian legal system.
1. Nature
First, addressing the nature of these contracts will allow us to
determine if surety bonds are more beneficial than standbys. Thus, I will
analyze the four elements that define the nature of standby letters of
credit as they apply to surety bonds. As to its irrevocability, there is no
substantial difference because a contract is not revocable; it cannot be
amended or cancelled unilaterally by the surety. In this sense, Article
6(c) of the URCB states that any amendment to a bond shall be
accorded in writing by the beneficiary, the principal and the
guarantor.127 This provision is derived from its contractual nature.
With regard to its binding nature, there is no difference either. A
contract is binding between the parties. However, surety bonds clearly
depart from the independency principle and the documentary nature of
standbys. Thus, surety bonds are not independent from the underlying
transaction. This is reflected in article 3(b) of the URCB, which
provides that the liability of the surety is accessory to the liability of the
principal under the contract.128 Hence, the primary obligation is held by
the principal. The payment obligation of the surety is secondary and
related to the underlying transaction.129 Accordingly, Article 3(d) states
that all defenses and remedies, which the principal has, shall be also
available to the surety in addition to any defense arising out of the bond.
Further, related to its accessory nature, surety bonds do not share the
documentary nature of standbys. Conversely, in surety bonds the
obligation of the surety before payment is not limited to the examination
of documents on their face. Article 7(h) of the URCB states that the
surety is entitled to request that the beneficiary supply further
information and documents as the surety may reasonably consider
necessary to evaluate the claim for payment. Accordingly, unlike first
demand guarantees, surety bonds are not payable on demand upon the
simple presentation of the claim. While in the former, the simple
demand and statement of default are considered conclusive evidence of
liability, in the latter it is not the case. Payment is not immediate
because there must be a proof of the default. Surety bonds are payable
127.

ICC UNIFORM RULES FOR CONTRACT BONDS, issued as ICC publication No. 524,

art.6(c) ("Any amendment to a Bond, including without limitation the increase of the Bond
Amount or the alteration of the Expiry Date, shall be in writing duly signed or executed by
authorized representatives of each of the Beneficiary, the Principal and the Guarantor.").
128. ICC Uniform Rules for Contract Bonds, issued as ICC publication No. 524, art. 3(b)
("The liability of the Guarantor to the Beneficiary under the Contract and shall arise upon
Default. The Contract is deemed to be incorporated into and form part of the Bond. The liability
of the Guarantor shall not exceed the Bond Amount.").
129. See Dunn & Petro, supra note 120, at 11.
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"upon the principal's established default." 30
Unlike standbys, sureties do not have to disregard non-documentary
conditions' 31 for payment. On the contrary, Article 7(h) indicates that
surities should evaluate both documentary and non-documentary
conditions before deciding to pay because the default needs to be clearly
established.132 Sureties will only answer "for the principal's default if
proven to be valid." 33 This is clearly expressed in Article 7(i) of the
URCB, which states that a claim shall not be honored unless a default
has occurred.134 Notwithstanding, this link to the underlying transaction
and the fact that the surety will be responsible for determining if there
was a default, may become troublesome since the other parties of the
contract bond might not agree with the surety's determination.
2. Other Characteristics
Besides their nature, Article 7(g) of the URCB asserts that upon
receipt of a claim, the surety shall send notice in writing to the principal
before making any payment or performing the obligation.' 35 This is an
important difference from the URDG, which does require informing the
principal but not before payments. Moreover, a surety may wait for the
response of the principal. In an independent guarantee, the issuer does
not need to wait for any answer. These differences are easily explained
due to the assessment of default that must be carried out by the surety.
On the other hand, Article 7(f) indicates that any claim for payment
shall also state that there has been a breach or default (statement of
default) and shall set out the circumstances of such default.' 36 Thus, in
this respect the URCB is more similar to the URDG than to the ISP98.
The statement of default and the explanation of its circumstances are
essential for the initiation of the investigation by the surety.
C. Disagreementwith the Determinationof the Surety
The greatest difficulty with surety bonds is the decision of the surety
to pay or not to pay. If it pays, it will seek to be indemnified by the
principal. Although indemnity agreements are often wed to cover this
possibility, there is always the risk that the principal debtor does not
want to indemnify the surety, adducing that there was not a default of
130.

See AFFAKI, supra note 56, at 136.

131. Terms or conditions not required in the surety bond or required in the bond but that
do not imply the presentation of documents.
132. See U.N. Commission, supra note 117.
133. See Dunn, supra note 111, at 9.
134. See U.N. Commission, supra note 126.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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the underlying transaction and thus, the surety erroneously made the
payment. On the other hand, if the surety refuses to pay because it finds
there was no default, the beneficiary could file a suit against the surety
requesting payment. 3 7
This Article focuses on the lenders perspective, so I will not address
the relationship between the principal and the surety, but only that
between the surety and the beneficiary. When the lender or beneficiary
claims the payment, the surety could deny the claim based upon the
same defenses the principal has. Overall, the surety will analyze the
underlying contract and the facts surrounding it to determine if the
project owner, who must have assigned the surety bond to the lender,
and the contractor both performed their respective obligations. If the
project company incurred a material breach of the underlying contract
before any breach by the obligor or induced the debtor's breach, then
the project company's termination of the underlying transaction is a
material breach that may exempt the surety from liability. 3 8
To sum up, the surety can deny liability if it determines there was no
breach of contract by the principal. Moreover, it can also deny liability
when there was a breach of the obligor but it was caused by a prior
material breach of the project company or it was induced by the obligee.
Furthermore, the surety could even deny liability under certain
circumstances when the principal defaulted and the project owner
performed its obligations. These defenses available to the surety include
the beneficiary's failure to provide appropriate and timely notice and its
failure to file suit within the time limits described in the bond or the

applicable law.1 39
Therefore, in the presence of such defenses the enforcement of
surety bonds may result in litigation.140 The wrong determination from
the surety denying the claim of the beneficiary will leave the lender
with the possibility of asserting contract claims against the surety for
breaching the contract bond, and possible, but less likely, tort claims.141
In the United States, some courts ruled that sureties are similar to
insurers and thus can recover in tort.142 However, this position is not
unanimous because other courts disagree and argue that sureties "should
not be subject to any damages beyond those recoverable under the
137. Cheryl S. Kniffen, A Georgia Practitioner'sGuide to Construction Performance
Bond Claims, 60 MERCER L. REv. 509, 522 (2009).
138. Philip L. Bruner et al., The Surety's Response to the Obligee's DeclarationofDefault
and Termination: "To Perform or not to Perform-that is the Question," 17 CONSTRUCTION L. 3,
9(1997).
139. Id. at 4.
140. Aron J. Frakes, Surety Bad Faith: Tort Recovery for Breach of a Construction
PerformanceBond, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 497, 498 (2002).
141. See Bruner et al., supra note 138, at 3.
142. See Frakes, supranote 140, at 499.
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contract itself."1 43 In a nutshell, the question is whether surety bonds are
similar enough to insurance policies to justify the imposition of tort
remedies or extra-contractual damages when the surety fails to honor
the contract bond acting with bad faith.144
The reasoning behind imposing tort remedies in the case of a bad
faith breach of an insurance policy by an insurer is that a policy is a
contract of adhesion. Such extra-contractual remedies are deemed
necessary due to the different bargaining power between an insurer and
the insured. It is considered of public interest to societyl 45 to provide the
insured with beyond-contractual remedies when the insurer acts in bad
faith. Notwithstanding the diverse opinions of different U.S. courts, the
argument in favor of tort recovery for breach of insurance policies is
hardly applicable to surety bonds because these are not insurance
policies. There are inherent differences between them like the tripartite
relationship in a surety bond and differences in purpose. 146 Thus, the
surety bond is not a contract of adhesion. The surety has obligations
before the project company but also before the principal debtor. It is
widely understood that it is a balanced contract where the liability of the
surety is "generally limited to the face amount of the bond." 47 The
major opinion is that imposing tort damages on the surety, would
"substantially shift the balance in the tripartite relationship."' 48
On the other hand, regarding their purpose, while surety bonds are
intended to guarantee the performance of obligations, the insurance
policy is designed to protect a party against the occurrence of certain
risks. The difference is apparent. Furthermore, the beneficiary of a
surety bond receives an additional benefit because the surety before
deciding to enter into a surety bond, prequalifies the contractor. 49 Thus,
at least theoretically the surety assumes little or no risk because its
undertaking is based upon a careful underwriting. Meanwhile, the fee
143. Id. n.13 ("Surety bad faith: Tort recovery for breach of a construction performance
bond"); Cates Constr., Inc. v. Talbot Partners, 980 P. 2d 407, 418-21 (Cal. 1999); Great Am.
Ins. Co. v. N. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1, 908 S.W. 2d 415, 420 (Tex. 1995).
144. See Frakes, supra note 140, at 505.
145. Id. at 504.
146. R. Cooper Shattuck, Bad Faith:Does it Apply to Sureties in Alabama?, 57 ALA. LAW.
241, 246(1996).
147. See Frakes, supra note 140, at 512.
148. Id. at 513:
It may encourage a project owner to allege contractor default more readily...,
[it] may compel sureties to pay questionable claims in order to avoid the risk of
tort liability and large punitive damage awards . . . [and] the obligee may give
them sufficient power to detrimentally affect the interest of the principals when
disagreements arise.
149.

Id. at 514.
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that the surety receives is for providing its creditworthiness at a
minimum risk, while the ?remium paid in the insurance policy depends
on statistical risks of loss. Fo
In sum, due to their different nature with insurance policies, surety
bonds cannot be subject to tort damages. If the surety breaches its
obligation to pay the bond, the obligee will be entitled to request
damages for breach of contract.1 5 1 Thus, the inclusion of a liquidated
damages clause in the bond may be useful to avoid the difficulty of
proving the amount of damages 5 during litigation.
D. PeruvianFianza
American lenders can request surety bonds from non-banking
entities. The surety bond does not exist in the Peruvian legal system. It
would be a contract governed only by party autonomy leaving aside the
application of any statutes but the general Peruvian contracts law. As
they are new instruments for Peruvian judges, the U.S. lenders might
evaluate their willingness to take the risks involved in the bond's
application by the Peruvian judicial system, which is normally slow and
inefficient even when applying the law to commonly used contracts.
The most similar instrument to a surety bond in Per' is the Fianza.
1. Peruvian Legislation Regarding Fianzas
Fianzas and surety bonds are accessory or secondary obligations that
guarantee the compliance with obligations of the principal, which can
be either payment obligations or performance obligations. The Fianza is
regulated in the Civil Code and it entails the obligation of the guarantor
to either pay or performl 53 if the principal defaults. As a surety bond,
the Fianza is also a contract but only between the guarantor and the
beneficiary. In fact, it does not need the consent of the principal, and
can be contracted even if the principal obligor opposes to its signing,
which may be a benefit for the lenders when comparing this contract to

a surety bond.154
In addition, its contractual nature makes Fianzas irrevocable and
binding. The guarantor will have to honor the Fianza and cannot amend
it or cancel it without the consent of the beneficiary, in this case, the
U.S. lender. In regard to its limited or unlimited nature, it will depend
150.

B. C. Hart & Howard E. Kane, What Every Real Estate Lawyer Should Know About

Payment and PerformanceBonds, 17 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 674, 676, (1992).

151. See Kniffen, supra note 137, at 523.
152. See Loke, supra note 9, at 45-46.
153. It is not a decision of the guarantor. This must be stipulated in the contract.
154. C6digo Civil, art. 18690 (The Fianza can be granted even without consent or notice to
the debtor.).
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on the agreement of the parties. The only limitation is that the guarantor
cannot oblige himself to more than the guaranteed obligation of the
principal.1s Nonetheless, it is a common practice to include in the
Fianzas a ceiling, in the form of a certain or determinable amount.
It is common practice to include an expiry date, but there is no legal
requirement to include it. Thus, a Fianza can exclude an expiry date.
Article 1899 of the Civil Code provides that the guarantor is entitled to
request that the beneficiary demand from the principal payment when
the original debt becomes due; otherwise after a 30-day period from the
request the guarantor will be released from the Fianza. 6 Nevertheless,
in case an expiry date is accorded, the guarantor will be exempted from
liability if the beneficiary does not present his claim within fifteen days
after the agreed expiry date.' 5 7 This is certainly a benefit for lenders.
On the other hand, the payment is not automatic nor immediate
under a Fianza. The guarantor will first have to analyze whether default
occurred. Thus, like the URCB, the obligation to inform the principal
about a claim is made before making any payment or performing so that
the guarantor has time and more information to achieve certainty about
the alleged default. If the default did not occur, the guarantor can
oppose this defense against the beneficiary because its payment
obligation is conditioned on the establishment of the principal's default.
Unlike standbys, guarantors bear the right to oppose all the defenses
available to the principal because of the accessory nature of the Fianza.
As a result, like surety bonds, the Fianzas can lead to serious litigation
in case of erroneous denial in honoring them.
Regarding the assignability of the Fianza, Article 1435 of the
Peruvian Civil Code requires the consent of both parties when a contract
is being assigned. As the Fianza is a contract, it would be necessary to
have the consent of the guarantor. However, the Fianza only obligates
the guarantor to perform. Hence, as the beneficiary has no obligations
under the contract but only rights, it would not be required to assign the
whole contract but only the beneficiary's rights, and according to
Article 1206 of the Peruvian civil code the assignment of rights does not
require the consent of the other party. It would be sufficient to inform
the guarantor about the assignment. If a surety bond is signed,
difficulties could arise because it is a tripartite arrangement but that will
155. Id. art. 18730 (The obligation of the guarantor is only for what it expressly has
engaged to, and cannot exceed the obligation of the principal debtor.).
156. Id. art. 18990 (When the Fianza has no term, the guarantor can request the creditor to
enforce its right and to sue the principal debtor, as soon as the debt is due. If the creditor does
not perform this right within the 30 day-period following the request or if it abandons the
proceeding, the guarantor is released from his obligation.).
157. Id. art. 18980 (When the Fianza has a term, the guarantor is released from any
liability if the creditor does not demand the fulfillment of the obligation within the 14 dayperiod following to the expiry date or if it abandons the proceeding.).
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depend on the terms and conditions negotiated and accorded to by the
parties.
Finally, the Peruvian Civil Code establishes that any extension of the
underlying transaction granted to the principal obligor without the
consent of the guarantor ends the Fianza, except when the guarantor
accepted extensions in advance. Thus, U.S. lenders should include a
clause in the Fianza providing the consent of the guarantor to continue
guaranteeing the underlying contract if it is extended.
2. What Instrument is More Beneficial to U.S. Lenders?
The Peruvian Fianza and contract or surety bonds are similar
instruments. However, U.S. lenders should be aware of their differences
to make an efficient decision between them.
First, surety bonds are contracts regulated in the United States by
acts or statutes at both the federal and state levels. These statutes even
provide bond forms. On the contrary, in Perd, the Fianzas are primarily
ruled by party autonomy and the Peruvian legislation is fairly flexible,
being its overall function to supplement the agreement of the parties.
This difference is also related to the fact that while sureties in the
United States are often banks or other specialized companies called
"bonding companies," in Perd the guarantors of a Fianza are normally
entities related to the principal. The federal government of the United
States publishes in the Federal Register a list of bonding companies
with certificates of authority as acceptable sureties of federal bonds.ss
In Perii there is no such Register.
Thus far, it is apparent that Fianzas might be riskier than surety
bonds because the former will depend to a great extent on what
conditions a U.S. lender can agree to with a potential guarantor, who is
likely to be an affiliate or a company somehow related to the principal,
without any governmental list of acceptable guarantors. Even if the
guarantor in the Fianza is an unrelated company to the principal, for
instance one of the other project participants in a project financing, a
surety bond might be more secure since a surety normally charges a fee
for its services and carefully evaluates and prequalifies the principal
obligor. With respect to the Fianza, it is normally gratuitous and there is
no comparable assessment of the debtor.
However, if U.S. lenders request surety bonds from Peruvian
entities, they could only be issued by non-banking institutions because
Peruvian banks issue CFBs. Moreover, as surety bonds do not exist in
the Peruvian legal system, they would be contracts governed only by
party autonomy leaving aside the application of any statutes but the
158.

See Hart & Kane, supra note 150, at 678-79.
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general Peruvian contract law. Therefore, the described benefits of
contract bonds under U.S. law would fade away if tried in Pen't. This
conclusion is reinforced by the lack of knowledge and expertise of
Peruvian judges with regard to the application of contract bonds.
This situation could lead to the use of Fianzas, which are well known
in the Peruvian legal system and have some benefits. As they are
agreements only between two parties, they do not need the consent of
the principal debtor, and can be contracted even if the obligor opposes
to its signing. In addition, it would be sufficient just to inform the
guarantor about the assignment of the rights of the lender. Furthermore,
the beneficiary has an additional fifteen day period after the agreed
expiry date to present his claim under the Fianza.
Nonetheless, the Fianza and surety bonds share the same big
difficulties because they are accessory or secondary obligations. The
wrong decision of the guarantor or surety to deny liability and oppose
defenses can lead to complex litigation, especially within the Peruvian
jurisdiction. Hence, as the possibility that the guarantor denies a claim
for payment opposing any of the defenses of the principal is high, it is
difficult to ascertain which is more beneficial to a U.S. lender, whether
a surety bond applied in Perd or a Fianza.
E. Enforcement
Under both U.S. and Peruvian jurisdictions, an order of specific
performance is hardly granted by judges. Even if the Fianza or contract
bond consists of an obligation by the guarantor to perform in case of
default of the obligor, the only remedy the lender will obtain is
damages. Therefore, when the guarantor denies a claim for payment and
litigation arises, it will become useful to have agreed on liquidated
damages within the bond or Fianza. If the Peruvian judge rules in favor
of the beneficiary it will enforce the liquidated damages clause against
the guarantor. Likewise, if the parties agreed upon a penalty in the
Fianza, that penalty will be enforced because the rule in Peruvian legal
system is to respect the party's autonomy.
On the other hand, the U.S. legal system refuses the application and
enforcement of penalty clauses and imposes some requirements on
liquidated damages provisions in order for them to be enforced. Overall,
according to U.S. laws, liquidated damages clauses must be the result of
an attempt by the parties at the time of contracting to furnish a
reasonable estimate of the probable harm and also must be
proportionate and reasonable in relation to actual damages. 5 9 These
reasonableness requirements are absent in the Peruvian legal system.
159. Susan V. Ferris, Liquidated Damages Recovery Under the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts,67 CORNELL L. REv. 862, 874 (1982).
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The underlying logic in the U.S. legal system is that the contractual
remedies must only compensate the actual damages. Hence, if courts
find a liquidated damages provision to be unreasonably high with
respect to the actual harm this provision will be considered a penalty,
and thus not enforceable. 60 The goal is to exclude the imposition of
punitive damages in contracts, in addition to compensatory damages.' 6 1
However, since some U.S. courts will consider surety bonds as
insurance policies, they will allow extra-contractual damages, so the
possibility that punitive damages are imposed if the surety denies
liability in bad faith, exists. In Pefi, the only available remedies when a
guarantor denies the claim are contractual. No tort recovery is allowed
in case of default of a Fianza. However, these contractual damages can
be high because the parties are free to agree on any liquidated damages
or penalties even if they exceed the actual harm.
All in all, under the Fianza, if the guarantor improperly denied
paying, the U.S. lender will be able to obtain any amount of liquidated
damages or penalties the parties agreed upon. If they agreed ona higher
sum than the actual harm, Peruvian judges will respect the agreement of
the parties, thus U.S. lenders could obtain damages they could not
procure in U.S. jurisdiction unless the U.S. court considered the surety
to be an insurer. Nevertheless, a trial in Per could be slow, costly, and
inefficient.
In conclusion, neither a surety bond applied in Pert nor a Fianza will
be efficient credit enhancement devices for U.S. lenders if the guarantor
or surety is a Peruvian entity and they submit the potential disputes to
the Peruvian jurisdiction. The right of the guarantor to deny the
payment and to bring opposition based on several grounds is highly
detrimental for the use of these credit enhancement devices. As surety
bonds are barely known in Per and Fianzas' effectiveness depends on
the Peruvian judiciary system, it is unlikely that U.S. lenders will
promptly obtain damages for the breach of the Fianza/contract bond
incurred by the guarantor/surety. In fact, there is a high possibility that
they will not obtain any damages at all.
CONCLUSION

U.S. lenders should be aware of the similarities, differences, and
complexities that are involved in using a common law device in a civil
law country. In particular, this Article demonstrated that standby letters
of credit are conceptually the same device as independent guarantees.
160. Aristides N. Hatzis, Having the Cake and Eating it too: Efficient Penalty Clauses in
Common and Civil ContractLaw, 22 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 381, 385 (2002).
161. Id. at 386.
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Peruvian legislation provides for CFBs, which are first demand
guarantees. Fraud is the only accepted defense of the issuing bank
against a demand for payment. However, the threshold for fraud is very
high; in particular in first demand guarantees like CFBs, thus this
defense will be argued under very limited circumstances. Hence, U.S.
lenders can rely to a great extent on this type of independent guarantee.
On the other hand, surety bonds and their parallel in PerG, the
Fianza, are secondary and accessory obligations for the guarantors.
They lack the independence principle that is present in CFBs. Thus, if
the surety/guarantor decides not to honor the bond/Fianza, it may
oppose the defenses that the principal obligor has under the underlying
transaction. Under this scenario, U.S. lenders would have to file a suit
against the guarantor for breach of the bond/Fianza. However, neither a
surety bond applied in Per6 nor a Fianza will be efficient credit
enhancement devices for U.S. lenders if the guarantor or surety is a
Peruvian entity and they submitted the potential disputes to the Peruvian
jurisdiction because surety bonds are barely known in Per6 and Fianzas'
effectiveness depends on the Peruvian judiciary system. The serious
enforcement problems that surety bonds applied in Per6 and Fianzas are
sufficient grounds for U.S. lenders to consider the use of CFBs instead.
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